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ABSTRACT: An interesting fact about the meaning of words is the compulsion to per-
ceive them; when we encounter a symbol, we perceive its meaning without the least 
mental effort. In this paper, I answer the questions, “How does the meaning of a word 
impose itself on us?” and “How does a symbol become meaningful and what is the mean-
ing of a symbol?” By emphasizing the time when we understand a word, I introduce the 
reality of words versus the language convention. By distinguishing between giving mean-
ing to words and their having a meaning, I show how, just like a reality, a word has a 
function appropriate to its unique character. We replace an independent entity called 
“meaning” with this function of understanding. Eventually, by distinguishing between the 
language act and the speaker’s act, I show that the creative aspect of language is related to 
the layer of the language act rather than the speaker’s act.
Introduction
The question of meaning is one of the 
persistent questions in philosophy. Colin 
McGinn states that meaning, selves, and 
consciousness are among the redoubtable 
traditional philosophical subjects (63). 
Questions regarding meaning are usually 
formalized in the form of various categori-
zations. Ned Block writes that we should 
differentiate between the two projects of 
linguistic semantics and metaphysical 
semantics. For instance, linguistic seman-
tics asks how particular expressions in a 
particular language fit together to make up 
the meaning of a longer expression, but 
metaphysical semantics is about investi-
gating the fundamental nature of meaning. 
Also, Jeff Speaks argues that the question 
of meaning can be divided into the two 
questions: “What is the meaning of this or 
that symbol (for a particular person or 
group)?” and “In virtue of what facts 
about that person or group does the sym-
bol have that meaning?”
Generally, two responses are given to 
the question, “What is the meaning of a 
particular symbol?” One response tries to 
search for the meaning of a symbol in 
relation to a specific object in the external 
world or representation of the world 
according to the sentence. The other 
response seeks to search for the 
meaning of a symbol in relation to other 
linguistic signs, which together form a 
system of signs.
It is generally accepted that the sound 
or symbol itself is not significant. By 
“sound,” I mean linguistic symbols, and it 
does not make any difference whether the 
symbol is a sound or text. But in order to 
maintain coherence in this study, I dis-
cuss only linguistic sounds instead of 
symbols. What gives significance to a lin-
guistic sound is usually considered to be 
something beyond that sound that some-
how makes that sound meaningful to us 
in a way that, by using sounds, we can 
speak beyond our current time and place, 
perceive the combination of unseen 
sounds, and have the capability of 
describing the world; through these sym-
bols we communicate satisfactorily with 
one another.
It is often assumed that meaning can-
not be a sound itself, because, as arbitrary 
elements, sounds cannot transcend our 
current time or speak about the future. 
Also, sound as a physical thing cannot be 
a presentation of a part of the physical 
world, since a physical thing cannot have 
the about-ness of another physical thing 
(Putnam). In other words, the sounds do 
not communicate with one another; 
rather, their meanings make communica-
tion possible.
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Nevertheless, when we hear or read a 
linguistic symbol, we perceive that sym-
bol easily. In a way, it could be said that 
symbols are imposed on the mind. 
William Lycan writes: “Those certain 
kinds of marks and noises have mean-
ing, and that we human beings grasp 
those meanings without even thinking 
about it, are very striking facts” (1). In 
other words, when we face a linguistic 
sound, we not only understand it easily 
but we also cannot not have an under-
standing of it. This issue becomes more 
conspicuous when we notice that the 
expressions that we normally hear are 
mostly new and original and that we 
have no prior familiarity with the set of 
sounds that we are hearing (Chomsky, 
Language and Mind, 10). Thomas Nagel 
asks: “What do we all have in our minds 
when, for instance, we think ‘Tobacco is 
getting more expensive every year’?” 
And he answers: “Consciously, at least, 
I don’t need anything more than the 
word itself in my mind to think, 
‘Tobacco is getting more expensive 
every year’” (42).
What Nagel is expressing here is the 
same “striking fact” about meaning that 
Lycan also states: that a linguistic sound 
is imposed on the mind. In this paper, I 
show how an answer to the question, 
“Why are sounds or symbols imposed on 
the mind?” is an answer to the question 
“What is the meaning of a particular sym-
bol?” Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, 
in answer to Alice’s question of “The 
question is, whether you CAN make 
words mean so many different things,” 
replies, “The question is, which is to be 
master – that’s all.” When Humpty 
Dumpty states that a word “means just 
what I choose it to mean – neither more 
nor less” (57), he is saying that we are the 
masters of words, not their slaves. But 
apparently, what really happens when we 
face linguistic sounds is that we are 
slaves of words, not their masters. In this 
paper, I show how words (linguistic 
sounds) cannot not have the meaning that 
they have.
Sign: Real vs. Arbitrary
Generally, we learn the phonetic part 
of language from the environment. 
Linguistic sounds and the behavior of the 
members of the language community in 
response to hearing these sounds are nat-
urally the only available data. W. V. 
Quine believes that “what the naturalist 
insists on is that even in the complex and 
obscure parts of language learning, the 
learner has no data to work with but the 
overt behavior of other speakers” (28). 
Even Noam Chomsky holds that although 
a child might have a list of concepts prior 
to any experience, yet the learner is look-
ing at the world to figure out which sound 
goes with the concept (Language and 
Problems, 191).
Likewise, the principle of the arbitrary 
nature of signs that is mentioned by 
Ferdinand Saussure is a principle for 
illustrating the relationship between 
sound and meaning (67). Here, arbitrari-
ness means that human language uses 
neutral sound symbols. There is no con-
nection between the word “dog” and the 
four-legged animal it symbolizes 
(Aitchison, 21).
To consider language as a convention 
in this sense is generally opposed to con-
sidering sounds to be natural as Plato 
ascribes to Cratylus. Cratylus believes 
that just as the shape, size, and form of an 
animal such as a horse are among its nat-
ural properties, the word “horse” must 
also be considered its natural property 
(Robins, 18). The idea of the convention-
ality of language or the arbitrariness of 
the relationship between form and mean-
ing in this sense seems to be acceptable; 
otherwise, the conventionality of lan-
guage does not mean that we are free to 
choose a particular linguistic sound.
What is meant by the conventionality 
of the relationship between form and 
meaning usually is that what is referred 
to as the meaning of a particular symbol 
is one side of the convention, and sound 
(a written, audio, visual, etc. sign) is the 
other side of the convention; it is this 
bilateral relationship that makes a partic-
16
DIALOGUE October, 2013
ular sign meaningful. The other side of 
the conventional relationship, which is 
called the “meaning” of a sound, can be 
an external object or the state of affairs – 
as mentioned in the theory of direct 
reference – or it can be an idea in the 
mind, as Locke believes.
However, we know that neither indi-
viduals nor society are free to change 
linguistic signs. For example, we are not 
free to use the word “sky” instead of the 
word “tree” and intend the same mean-
ing. In this regard, Saussure writes:
The signifier, though to all appear-
ances freely chosen with respect to the 
idea that it represents, is fixed, not 
free, with respect to the linguistic 
community that uses it. The masses 
have no voice in the matter, and the 
signifier chosen by language could be 
replaced by no other. This fact, which 
seems to embody a contradiction, 
might be called colloquially ‘the 
stacked deck’. […] No individual, 
even if he willed it, could modify in 
any way at all the choice that has been 
made; and what is more, the commu-
nity itself cannot control so much as a 
single word; it is bound to the existing 
language. [71]
Therefore, although the relationship 
between form and meaning is an arbitrary 
one, this arbitrariness does not mean that 
we are free to interfere with this relation-
ship. On the other hand, as I mentioned in 
the introduction, one fact about meaning 
is the imposition of the word on the mind, 
just as Lycan or, in my opinion, Nagel 
states. The imposition of linguistic sounds 
on the mind challenges their arbitrariness 
at the individual level. At the social level, 
society’s inability to change a linguistic 
sign arbitrarily also challenges the arbi-
trary relationship between form and 
meaning. If we leave establishing a con-
ventional relationship between sound and 
meaning to language itself, then we face 
the question of how language can select a 
sound for a concept independently of indi-
viduals or society. In order to reconcile 
the arbitrariness of signs and their com-
pulsoriness once a linguistic sign gains 
currency, Saussure introduced the idea of 
“compulsory choice.” But it seems that 
compulsory choice is less a solution for 
reconciling arbitrariness and compulsori-
ness in the relationship between form and 
meaning than merely a description of an 
existing fact.
It appears that by distinguishing 
between two different times in our dis-
cussion of a linguistic sign, we may 
expect to reconcile the arbitrariness of 
linguistic signs and the compulsoriness of 
understanding linguistic signs while 
encountering them; when we say a sound 
is imposed on the mind, we are speaking 
of a time that a certain person encounters 
a linguistic sound, that is, he or she is 
perceiving or producing a linguistic sign. 
From now on, I refer to this time as the 
live time of understanding. On the other 
hand, when we speak of the arbitrariness 
or compulsoriness of the relationship 
between form and meaning, we are dis-
cussing a linguistic sign without being 
primarily concerned with the understand-
ing of that linguistic sign. For instance, 
when we say that we could have used 
another word instead of the word “dog” 
that would convey the same concept, we 
are speaking of a specific sound that, his-
torically, could have been otherwise 
chosen for a particular concept. In fact, 
when we do not have the understanding 
of a linguistic symbol in mind but rather 
speak about that linguistic symbol, we 
can defend the conventionality or arbi-
trariness of the relationship between form 
and meaning. I refer to this time as the 
non-live time of understanding.
In brief, distinguishing between the 
live and non-live time of understanding 
can explain why we can regard the rela-
tionship between form and meaning as 
arbitrary and also can consider the under-
standing of a sound as compulsory. The 
compulsoriness of understanding refers to 
the time when the understanding of a lin-
guistic sound is active and we encounter 
that sound in our everyday life. Also, 
considering the relationship arbitrary or 
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compulsory occurs when we speak about 
that sound and are not primarily con-
cerned with understanding that sound.
In the introduction to this paper, I men-
tioned that taking into consideration the 
fact that a sound is imposed on the mind, I 
seek to find an answer to the question, 
“What is the meaning of a symbol?” 
Considering what was stated above, what 
I mean by the imposition of a sound on 
the mind is a concentration on the live 
time of understanding. Also, what I intend 
by the imposition of a sound is somewhat 
identical to Nagel’s statement that in order 
to understand a word, we do not need any-
thing more than the word itself. In fact, 
we can speak of the relationship between 
form or sound and meaning only when we 
are discussing a linguistic sign. But in the 
live time of understanding, all that is real 
is the sound (the sign’s form), which, 
when we encounter it, we are compelled 
to understand.
To be more accurate, at the live time 
of understanding, there is no relationship 
between sound and meaning. This does 
not mean that our symbols are meaning-
less but rather that the meaning of a 
symbol or sound is that sound itself and 
there is no relationship to be found. The 
relationship here is restricted to the time 
when we are discussing symbols, that is, 
the non-live time of understanding. But, 
at the live time of understanding, what is 
real is the imposition of a sound on the 
mind in a way that the sound also pro-
vides us with an understanding.
Therefore, my answer to the question, 
“What is the meaning of a particular sym-
bol or sound?” is that the meaning of a 
sound is the sound itself. Speaking of the 
relationship between the meaning and the 
sound is also related to the non-live time 
of understanding, but at the live time of 
understanding, the meaning of a sound is 
identical to the understanding we have 
when encountering that sound. If we 
accept this response, we will have to deal 
with at least two main questions. The first 
question is, “If the meaning of a sound is 
the sound itself, then why are some 
sounds meaningful and some meaning-
less?” In other words, why should a 
particular linguistic sound create a certain 
understanding and not some other under-
standing? The second question is “How 
can a symbol, which is a physical thing 
like sound, arise from the creative aspect 
of language and meaning?” In the other 
sections of this paper, I answer these 
questions.
I have borrowed the idea of this paper 
and the provided answers from the notion 
of the reality of words, which was intro-
duced by Behin Arbabi.
Giving Meaning vs. Having a Meaning
In the previous section, I distinguished 
between the live time of understanding, 
that is, when a particular linguistic sound 
is active, and the non-live time of under-
standing, that is, when we speak about a 
particular sound. To answer the question, 
“Why should a linguistic sound create a 
certain understanding?” we must distin-
guish between a sound’s having a 
meaning and giving meaning to a sound.
At the live time of understanding, that 
is, when we encounter a linguistic sound, 
that sound is meaningful to us or creates 
an understanding. This understanding, 
which I regard as equivalent to the mean-
ing of the symbol, is a compulsory 
understanding that is imposed on the 
mind. On the other hand, I mentioned 
that when we discuss a linguistic sign, we 
speak of something called meaning, 
which is in a conventional relationship 
with a sound. Thus, here we have to dis-
tinguish between the understanding that 
is created in a certain person’s mind when 
he encounters a sound and the meaning of 
the sound that is intended while discuss-
ing (or talking about) a sign.
Usually, the meaning of a word such 
as “tree” is considered in two ways. First, 
and above all, the meaning of this word, 
which is an element in the language sys-
tem, depends on its relationship with 
other words within that system. Second, 
its meaning depends on a particular 
object in the external world. In fact, these 
two aspects are the meaning of a symbol 
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when speaking about the symbol. This 
meaning refers to the non-live time of 
understanding, and it is here that we can 
place this meaning in a conventional rela-
tionship with a sound.
Normally, what is intended by the 
meaning of a linguistic sound are the fac-
tors that give meaning to it. The external 
world, the relationships of a sign in a sys-
tem of signs, the speakers’ behavior while 
encountering a particular sound, and so 
on, which are often considered to be the 
meaning of a sound, can be among the 
factors that give meaning to a sound 
rather than being the understanding of 
that sound at the live time of understand-
ing. The distinction between having a 
meaning and giving meaning can be 
explained in this way: just as giving 
directions to a particular place is different 
from being in that place, giving meaning 
to a sound is different from understand-
ing the sound itself.
Therefore, when we say that the mean-
ing of a sound is the sound itself, it does 
not mean that we should ignore the fac-
tors that give meaning to a sound. It 
means that what is intended by the mean-
ing of a sound can justify the 
conventional relationship between a 
physical symbol and a concept rather 
than explaining why a sound is imposed 
on the mind. In fact, in order to under-
stand a word while hearing it in everyday 
life (for instance, while reading a text or 
listening to the words of another person), 
we do not need anything else; we neither 
think of the relationship of that word with 
the external world nor with other linguis-
tic symbols nor a particular social 
behavior, but when we want to talk about 
that word, then we can mention any of 
these factors or other relationships.
I previously mentioned that in the live 
time of understanding, the linguistic con-
vention cannot be taken into 
consideration the way it is discussed at 
the non-live time of understanding. 
As a matter of fact, during the live time 
of understanding, no conventional rela-
tionship can be traced between a sound 
and its meaning. For the linguistic con-
vention during the live time of 
understanding, Arbabi uses the term real-
ity of word (Zaban-e Fahmha). “Reality 
of word” means that when we face a lin-
guistic sound or symbol, this sound 
imposes itself on the mind as a reality 
like any other reality. What I mean by “as 
a reality like any other reality” is that, 
just as when encountering a tree, for 
instance, we see only a tree and nothing 
else, when facing a linguistic sound we 
are somehow compelled to understand 
that sound and nothing else.
In semantics, there is no such thing as 
the meaning of objects. Facing objects or 
the state of affairs in the external world, 
we just perceive and understand them. 
But it is when we discuss language that 
the issue of meaning is raised. 
Apparently, the most important reason for 
this is that a linguistic symbol is regarded 
as a neutral element, the meaning of 
which should come from something 
beyond it. But, if we accept the distinc-
tion between the live time of 
understanding and the non-live time of 
understanding and grant that during the 
live time of understanding the relation-
ship between a sound and its meaning is 
not conventional, then a sound, like any 
other physical object, will create the same 
understanding that it possesses.
Just as some of the factors that help 
us recognize a state of affairs in the 
world or an object are related to society 
and culture and some of them are related 
to human vision and the physical organ-
ism, the factors that give meaning to a 
sound, including external facts, social 
behavior, and being in a sign system, 
lead to a particular understanding of a 
sound and are not the understanding or 
meaning of that sound.
The reality of a sound is like the real-
ity of a tree or a car and, just like a car, 
has a unique function that suits its fea-
tures and character. Just as the 
components of a machine, such as the 
history of its development, its compatibil-
ity with the road and human anatomy, 
and so on, comprise the character and 
features of that machine and not the 
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machine itself, all of the things that add 
meaning to a sound and specify it are not 
the understanding of that sound but rather 
merely give meaning to it.
The factors that give meaning to a lin-
guistic sound comprise the “character” of 
that sound. This character and its charac-
teristics are made by the sound’s 
relationship with the world, its relation-
ship with other linguistic signs, and its 
relationship with the behaviors of the 
society’s members. When a linguistic 
sound gained its character, it functions 
based on that character and produces an 
understanding. This understanding is 
imposed on the mind because it functions 
based on the sound’s character.
The factors that give meaning to a lin-
guistic sound comprise the “character” of 
that sound. What I mean by “character” 
are the characteristics that a word gains. 
And these characteristics can be the rela-
tionship with the world, relationship with 
other linguistic signs, and relationship of 
the words with the members of society, as 
when a linguistic sound gained its charac-
ter, it functions based on that character 
and produces an understanding. This 
understanding is imposed on the mind 
because it functions based on the sound’s 
character.
Therefore, it could be said that a par-
ticular understanding of a linguistic 
sound is the result of factors that make it 
meaningful. This particular understand-
ing cannot go beyond the range of factors 
that make it meaningful or produce an 
understanding that is not a product from a 
process of meaning-giving or is not part 
of the character of that sound.
In brief, considering words as conven-
tional implies that there is a relationship 
between a sound and its meaning. But 
considering words as real implies the 
idea that there is not a relationship 
between a sound and what has made the 
sound meaningful at the time of encoun-
tering it (live time of understanding). In 
order to understand a sound, we do not 
need anything more than the sound itself, 
and sounds are perceived effortlessly 
(Lycan, 1; Nagel, 42). Therefore, if what 
is meant by meaning is understanding a 
linguistic sound, then the reality of 
words can explain how this linguistic 
sound is perceived. But if what is 
intended by meaning is what makes a 
linguistic sound meaningful, then we 
must doubt the existence of something 
called meaning that is responsible for 
understanding a linguistic sound.
Skepticism about an entity called 
“meaning” can also be found in the late 
works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
Quine. Wittgenstein states that “If we had 
to name anything which is the life of the 
sign, we should have to say that it was its 
use” (4). As John Lyons puts it, 
Wittgenstein’s answer to the question of 
meaning is that there is no such thing as 
meaning. In fact, all we need regarding 
meaning is using a sign in a particular 
linguistic game (41).
Quine also considered uncritical 
semantics as the myth of a museum and, 
following Dewey, believed that meaning 
is primarily a property of behavior (27). 
He writes: “Surely one has no choice but 
to be an empiricist so far as one’s theory 
of linguistic meaning is concerned” (81). 
Here, empiricism for Quine is linguistic 
behaviorism. By introducing the discus-
sion of radical translation, which starts 
from home, he shows that not only is 
meaning neither fixed nor definite but that 
even extension is never definite (48). 
Here, the meaning of a sentence is not 
determined by reality but rather depends 
on our translation guide. And the refer-
ence of a word depends on the ontology 
created in our translation guide (Medina, 
73-4), so we can no longer speak of a 
fixed and definite entity called “meaning.”
What I mentioned about understand-
ing a linguistic sound or symbol during 
the live time of understanding also 
included skepticism about an entity called 
“meaning,” but not exactly in the same 
way that Wittgenstein or Quine believed. 
Both of them recognize a relationship 
between the sound and what they men-
tion instead of meaning. But I stated that 
what is often referred to as meaning is, in 
fact, a factor that gives meaning to a lin-
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guistic sound rather than meaning’s being 
an entity that we are transferred to while 
encountering a linguistic sound. So we 
can doubt the existence of an entity called 
“meaning” but not through the ways men-
tioned so far.
Function of Language vs.  
Function of the Speaker
In the previous section, I explained 
how at the live time of understanding, a 
linguistic sound creates a particular 
understanding. In the following, I offer an 
answer to the question, “How can a lin-
guistic sound, which has already become 
meaningful and has gained its own char-
acter of understanding, also explain the 
creative aspect of language?”
One of Chomsky’s most important 
works is answering the question that he 
refers to as “Plato’s problem.” Plato’s 
problem asks “How can we know so 
much when the evidence is so slight?” As 
Chomsky notes, Bertrand Russell asks a 
similar question: “How comes it that 
human beings, whose contacts with the 
world are brief and personal and limited, 
are nevertheless able to know as much as 
they do know?” (Russell, quoted in 
Chomsky, Knowledge, xxv). I think 
Quine is raising the same issue when he 
says that what has prompted epistemol-
ogy has always been to find out how 
evidence relates to theory and in what 
ways one’s theory of nature transcends 
any available evidence, or in other words, 
how mind can have a meager input and a 
torrential output (83).
The idea of the reality of words – con-
sidering words as real just like any other 
real thing – dims the distinction between 
language and non-language (the ultimate 
goal of this idea is to remove this distinc-
tion). Therefore, creativity is a 
characteristic of our understanding and 
not just a characteristic of language. 
Plato, Russell, and Quine all ask about 
creativity in understanding and not 
merely in language. In fact, just as in 
numerous situations, which are often 
new, we can understand the meaning of a 
word, in numerous different situations we 
can also understand an external reality. 
Just as the word “chair” might create dif-
ferent understandings in various 
situations, the external chair creates dif-
ferent understandings in various contexts.
In order to discuss creativity, we must 
distinguish between two layers of discus-
sion. One discussion layer is the function 
of the speaker, and the other is the func-
tion of the words. Here, since we 
consider a person’s understanding as the 
result of the function of the word, then 
the function of the speaker is meaningless 
and is just a discussion layer. The creativ-
ity aspect of our cognition is related to 
the function of the words or our under-
standings and not the functions of the 
speaker or perceiver.
For instance, consider the phrase 
“five chairs”; we call the understanding 
of the first word A and the understand-
ing of the second word, that is, “chair,” 
B. Now the question is how do we 
reach the understanding of AB, that is, 
“five chairs”? Any possible understand-
ing may be replaced with A and B, and 
even each AB can be a new A or B in 
the next stage. The third understanding, 
which is obtained through the multipli-
cation or combination of the primary 
understandings A and B, is new, origi-
nal, and creative. The idea of the reality 
of words expresses that the third AB 
understanding is formed based on the 
character of understanding of each A or 
B. In fact, just as two chemical agents 
can combine and form a new substance 
based on their characteristics, any new 
understanding that is produced as a 
result of previous understandings fol-
lows a similar function.
Introducing limited rules – for exam-
ple, biological rules, as Chomsky states 
or even Wittgenstein’s rule-following – in 
order to justify creativity, confuses these 
two levels, and more attention is paid to 
the layer of the function of the speaker. 
Whereas by accepting the idea of the 
reality of words, each word or linguistic 
phrase is a reality that has its own unique 
behavior that fits its character and that 
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can or cannot be combined with other 
words. Here, the speaker or perceiver is 
only the place/location where these reali-
ties function. Raising the discussion of 
limited rules in order to justify the cre-
ativity of cognition (language) is similar 
to considering the creation of a new 
chemical substance from two other sub-
stances as the act of the chemist rather 
than as characteristics of those sub-
stances. The idea of the conventionality 
of language is one of the reasons why the 
difference between these two layers is not 
noticed. Regarding language as conven-
tional implies that the speaker must 
establish a mutual relationship between 
sound and meaning whether consciously 
or institutionalized.
One objection may be that I consider 
language as consisting merely of words, 
while words are just part of language. In 
fact, the role of grammar and syntax and 
the significance of semantic discussions 
cannot be easily ignored. The idea of the 
reality of words can be extended to sen-
tences and larger units. The central point 
of this idea is that when we hear a lin-
guistic sound or set of sounds, we have 
an understanding of them. This under-
standing is always a single 
understanding. For example, when we 
hear a sentence like “Snow is white,” we 
eventually reach an understanding of the 
sentence that is a simple understanding. 
As a matter of fact, it does not matter 
how many words our sentence includes; 
what matters is that we eventually reach a 
final, single understanding of that sen-
tence. Although it could be said that 
while hearing this sentence, we have 
understandings of its components, even-
tually we form an understanding of the 
entire sentence.
The expressive innovation that Alfred 
Tarski uses in order to introduce his the-
ory of truth can be helpful in clarifying 
what is meant by words in this article. 
Tarski states his theory of truth in this 
way: “Snow is white” is true if, and only 
if, snow is white. He adds: “Let me point 
out that the phrase ‘snow is white’ occurs 
on the left side of this equivalence in quo-
tation marks, and on the right without 
quotation marks. On the right side we 
have the sentence itself, and on the left 
the name of the sentence” (343). When a 
listener hears an expression such as S, 
there is an evident external sound and an 
understanding corresponding to it that is 
the understanding of this S. Here, this 
understanding or “S” is a single under-
standing and a name/word for that 
sentence or expression S.
From this perspective, we can explain 
how frequently used expressions – such 
as proverbs – are capable of being 
quickly transferred and understood just 
like words.  Frequently used expressions 
such as “How are you?” “Good morn-
ing,” and so on have been loaded as a 
single word. In fact, frequently used 
expressions, although composed of sev-
eral different sounds, cognitively form a 
distinctive and meaningful totality. When 
a person encounters one of these expres-
sions, the entire expression is understood, 
just like a single word. In fact, such 
expressions are comprised of several 
sounds externally but cognitively are as a 
distinct single word because their compo-
nents may not be understood individually.
In order to explain the quick under-
standing of frequently used expressions, 
Danny Steinberg states that frequently 
used expressions, just like single words, 
are kept as a whole in the memory (124). 
There is no need to create or to analyze 
these linguistic forms like new expres-
sions or sentences. In order to express 
and to understand these stored elements, 
language users consider them as a whole, 
and there is no need to apply grammati-
cal principles. The higher the frequency 
of using a word, phrase, or sentence, the 
higher its accessibility for quick use will 
be. By introducing agglutination, 
Saussure also tries to answer this issue. 
He says that the basis of agglutination is 
that two or more elements, which have 
originally been distinct from one another 
but have been juxtaposed in the chain of 
frequency, have turned into an irresolv-
able, or rarely resolvable, unit (175-6). 
When a combined concept is expressed 
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using a series of highly common mean-
ingful units, by using a so-called 
shortcut, the mind ignores the analysis 
and generally matches the concept with a 
group of signs that hereafter turn into a 
simple unit.
But the important point is that we can-
not determine the boundary between 
frequently used and not frequently used 
expressions. Some expressions are used 
more frequently than others; some 
expressions are used more frequently by 
certain groups of experts or social groups 
than others. Also, some expressions may 
be frequently used by one individual in 
regard to his or her condition.
Storing these entirely in memory – 
what Steinberg mentions – or the mind’s 
adopting the shortcut path – which is dis-
cussed by Saussure – does not seem to be 
a suitable solution for this problem. This 
is especially because taking into consid-
eration the relativity of the concept of 
frequent use, there are too many fre-
quently used expressions to be stored in 
memory. In such cases, we had better say 
that the entire expression becomes mean-
ingful, and consequently, the function of 
understanding the entire expression is 
similar to a single word. In fact, an 
expression such as S gains a final single 
understanding “S,” and according to the 
character of this expression, of which the 
factor of being frequently used is a part, it 
is quickly understood.
I draw two conclusions from this dis-
cussion. First, there may be one or more 
frequently used or relatively frequently 
used expressions in a sentence; for exam-
ple, the phrase “table and chair” is more 
frequently used than “chair and book.” 
Here, the way we use these expressions in 
a sentence leads to the conclusion that 
understanding frequently used expressions 
is formed more quickly than understand-
ing other expressions. Therefore, unlike 
the imposed system of senses, which 
makes the linguistic sound linear, ours is a 
step-by-step understanding.
The second conclusion that I want to 
draw from this discussion is that in fre-
quently used expressions – I mentioned 
that frequency is relative and probably 
has a wide range – single words produce 
almost no understanding and it is the 
entirety of the expression that has been 
loaded and characterized as a word. For 
example, the word “take” does not exist 
in regard to understanding in expressions 
like “take it easy,” “take the bus,” “take 
care,” and so on where it is used; it is the 
entire expression that is meaningful. In 
most metaphors and phrases, in regard to 
cognition, words do not exist at all, and it 
is the entire expression that has a mean-
ingful character. Prepositions, prefixes, 
suffixes, and so on, usually are not per-
ceived in sentences and, in fact, are 
dissolved into the total understanding of 
the sentence.
Conclusion
In order to understand a linguistic 
sound, we do not need anything more 
than the sound itself, because the mean-
ing of a linguistic sound is identical to the 
sound itself. Sounds are real – just like 
any other real thing – and are understood 
just as any other thing is understood. This 
was my answer to the question, “What is 
the meaning of a symbol?” This answer 
can satisfactorily explain why, when we 
face a linguistic sound, we cannot not 
understand that sound.
The issue of linguistic convention is 
the most important challenge facing this 
response. But by distinguishing between 
the live time of understanding and the 
non-live time of understanding, I showed 
that the issue of linguistic convention 
refers to the non-live time of understand-
ing, and the issue of reality and not the 
arbitrariness of a linguistic symbol is 
related to the live time of understanding. 
Thus, in the live time of understanding, 
that is, when a particular individual 
encounters a linguistic sound, he or she 
perceives that sound like any other reality 
that he or she is faced with. In fact, just 
as when we see, for example, a tree, we 
are compelled to perceive it, while hear-
ing a sound, we are forced to understand 
it. Both are real, and in accordance with 
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the character they have gained, they cre-
ate an understanding in us.
If the relationship between a sound 
and its meaning is conventional and 
optional, then the question is raised as to 
why, when encountering an arbitrary sign 
that is considered neutral, the mind is 
compelled to understand it. Why does the 
juxtaposition of two dissimilar signs, 
such as “evening” and “sun,” create an 
understanding that is not to be found in 
either one of these signs?
The answer provided by this article is 
that a linguistic sound gains meaning in 
various ways and finds its own character 
and then functions according to this char-
acter, just as an object in the external 
world does. The idea of the conventional-
ity of language confuses the methods of 
giving meaning to a sound with the 
meaning of that sound. Then, to preserve 
the creative aspect of language, this idea 
has to resort to some rules that are always 
threatened by any new expression within 
the language and have to be revised or to 
be replaced by new rules. But if a word is 
real, then it can be shown that the cre-
ative aspect of language is related to the 
layer of words rather than to the individ-
ual who is compelled to understand them.
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